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#2A-11/25/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF MONROE and MONROE 
COUNTY SHERIFF. 
Respondents, 
—and- CASE NO. U-737 6 
SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES. 
AFSCME COUNCIL 82 AND MONROE COUNTY 
DEPUTY SHERIFFS LOCAL 29 64 OF THE 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE. COUNTY. 
AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
BERNARD WINTERMAN, for Respondent County of Monroe 
CHARLES R. VALENZA. ESQ.. COUNTY ATTORNEY (CHARLES 
MILLER. ESQ.. of Counsel) for Respondent Monroe County 
Sheriff 
PETER HENNER. ESQ.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Security 
and Law Enforcement Employees. AFSCME Council 82 and Monroe 
County Deputy Sheriffs Local 2964 of the American Federation 
of State. County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (Local 
2964) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing so much of its charge as alleged that the County of 
Monroe and Monroe County Sheriff (Joint Employer) violated 
§§209-a.l(a). (c) and (d) of the Taylor law.^ 
i^The ALJ also dismissed a specification of the charge 
that the Joint Employer violated §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law. 
but no exceptions were filed to that part of her decision. 
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The alleged violation of §209-a.l(d) is that the Joint 
Employer unilaterally assigned civil duties to those of its 
employees who were not in its Civil Bureau. The alleged 
violation of §§209-a.l(a) and (c) is that such action of the 
Joint Employer was improperly motivated, the Joint Employer's 
intention being the frustration of its employees' rights of 
organization and representation as guaranteed by §§202 and 
203 of the Taylor Law. 
FACTS 
The Joint Employer employs, and Local 2964 represents, 
four different groups of deputy sheriffs. Respectively, 
these employees are in the Police Bureau, the Jail Bureau, 
the Civil Bureau, and Court Security. Local 2964 and the 
Joint Employer have been parties to a series of collective 
bargaining agreements. On March 15. 1984. when the charge 
herein was filed, the parties were subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement that covered the period of January 1. 
1982 through December 31. 1984. That agreement contains a 
salary schedule which provides higher pay to Police and Jail 
Deputy Sheriffs than to Civil and Court Security Deputies. 
It also contains a clause, applicable to all unit employees, 
prohibiting removal "except for just cause shown only after a 
departmental hearing upon stated charges." 
Notwithstanding this job security clause, a new sheriff 
may decide to demote or dismiss one of the deputies appointed 
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by his predecessor so long as that deputy's office requires 
. . . . 2/ him to perform some civil obligations.— This is because 
State law makes a sheriff personally liable for the actions 
of his Civil Deputies and the courts have held that a sheriff 
therefore "cannot be denied his right to employ only those 
3/ Civil Deputies of his own choosing."— 
After taking office on January 1. 1980, Monroe County 
Sheriff Andrew Meloni dismissed Deputy Sheriff Fagan, and 
Local 2964 filed a grievance alleging a violation of the job 
security clause contained in the parties' agreement covering 
the period January 1. 1978 through December 31, 1979. The 
Supreme Court, Monroe County, issued an order staying 
arbitration on the ground that Sheriff Meloni had the right, 
as a newly elected sheriff, to dismiss Fagan. This decision 
was appealed to the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, 
which, on November 9, 1982, remanded the matter to the lower 
court for the purpose of ascertaining whether Deputy Sheriff 
. . 4/ Fagan was a Civil Deputy.— 
On November 25, 1980, while this matter was pending in 
court, a deputy in the Police Bureau performing road patrol 
duties was given the assignment of serving a civil paper 
1/Reese v. Lombard. 46 N.Y. 2d 904 (1979). 
1/Countv of Monroe v. AFSCME Council 82. 90 A.D. 2d 
968. 969 (4th Dep't 1982). 
A/id. 
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during the course of his routine patrol. Local 2964 filed a 
grievance alleging a violation of §2.3.1 of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement. In pertinent part, that 
section states: 
[U]nder no circumstances may . . . changes be 
made in."thei specif "Teat ions for any existing 
position, until such changes have been 
discussed with the Union . . . . Upon 
consultation with the Union, the Employer may 
then designate the new job classification . . . . 
The grievance was brought to arbitration and, on August 7. 
1981. the arbitrator found that the service of civil papers 
was not part of the regular duties of deputies in the Police 
Bureau and that the assignment complained about was therefore 
N a unilateral action of the Joint Employer. He held that this 
unilateral action violated the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement, then in force, because the Joint Employer had not 
discussed the change with Local 2964. In this connection, he 
stated: 
[A]ll that the contract requires is that 
previous discussion be had with the Union 
before the Sheriff changes the specifications 
(content) of the Road Patrol position. In 
such regard, he is not foreclosed from making 
the change but merely must await its 
implementation until after such discussion. 
The above quoted language of §2.3.1 of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement, as it existed in November 
1980, was carried forward, without change, into the parties' 
1982-1984 agreement, the period relevant to the charge herein. 
) 
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Eleven months after the arbitration award, on July 9, 
1982, a representative of the Sheriff initiated a discussion 
during the course of a labor-management meeting regarding the 
service of civil papers by deputies who are regularly 
assigned road patrol responsibilities. She stated that the 
Sheriff would exercise his discretion to make such 
assignments. A representative of Local 2964 objected and 
expressed his opinion that the Sheriff could not do so 
without an agreement on the matter. No such assignments were 
actually made until March 1983, and Local 2964 was not aware 
of the twelve such assignments made during the balance of 
that year. 
In November 1983, after the Appellate Division remanded 
the Fagan matter to Special Term, and before the matter was 
decided there, the Joint Employer delivered to Local 2964 an 
amended job description of all deputies not in the Civil 
Bureau specifying that each "performs civil duties as 
required." The Joint Employer discussed this change with 
Local 2964 at a Joint Labor-Management Committee meeting held 
in December 1983 or January 1984. at which time Local 2964 
expressed its objection to the change. It is the amendment 
of the job description that precipitated the charge herein. 
The Joint Employer's witnesses testified that it changed 
the job description of the deputies in order to afford the 
Sheriff greater flexibility in performing his civil duties. 
10048 
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More particularly, they indicated that this was needed in 
order to facilitate the service of civil papers at times 
other than the regular working hours of Civil Deputies, 
without paying premium wages to the Civil Deputies and under 
conditions where service of papers might incur risks for 
which Civil Deputies were not trained. 
The record shows, however, that while approximately 
6.000 civil papers are served each year by the Sheriff's 
staff, between March 23, 1983 and May 17. 1984. only 17 were 
sent to deputies performing road patrol functions for service 
and. of these. 11 were served during the regular working 
hours of Civil Deputies. Moreover, there is no record 
evidence that any civil papers were sent to deputies in the 
Jail Bureau for service. The record also shows one instance 
when the service involved a risk. On that occasion, the 
assignment was given to a civil deputy and a deputy in the 
Police Bureau was sent as an escort. 
A witness for Local 2964 testified that at a pre-hearing 
conference on the improper practice charge, the Manager of Labor 
Relations for the County of Monroe stated that the Sheriff 
"intended to preserve the rights of the office and pass on to his 
successor the same rights that he came into the office with." 
This testimony was not addressed in cross-examination nor by any 
other witness; the County's Manager of Labor Relations was 
present at the hearing, but did not testify. 
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DISCUSSION 
We affirm the determination of the ALJ that the Joint 
Employer's conduct did not violate §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor 
Law. It did not constitute a refusal to negotiate in good 
faith. The parties' agreement, as interpreted by an arbitrator, 
contemplated changes in the job content of deputy sheriffs so 
long as the Sheriff first discussed the changes with Local 2964. 
The complaint here is that the job content of deputy sheriffs was 
changed unilaterally. The specific issue raised by this 
specification of the charge is whether the discussions that took 
place at the Joint Labor-Management Committee meeting of December 
1983 or January 1984 were sufficient to satisfy the Joint 
Employer's contractual obligation. This is an issue of contract 
enforcement and not of good faith negotiations. Accordingly, 
even if there is merit in Local 2964's complaint, it does not 
5/ 
rise to the level of a violation of §209-a.1(d).— 
We also affirm the determination of the ALJ that the Joint 
Employer's conduct did not violate §209-a.l(c) of the Taylor 
Law. It provides that a public employer may not "discriminate 
against any employee for the purpose of encouraging or 
discouraging membership in. or participation in the activities 
of, any employee organization." The record is devoid of any 
evidence of such intent. 
.^/Section 205.5(d) of the Taylor Law and St. Lawrence 
Co. . 10 PERB 1F3058 (1977). 
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We reverse the decision of the ALJ insofar as she found 
no violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. It provides 
that a public employer may not "interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed 
in §202 for the purpose of depriving them of such rights." 
Section 202 assures public employees of the right to form, 
join and participate in an employee organization. This is 
intimately related to the §203 right to be represented by an 
employee organization. Action taken for the purpose of 
frustrating the right of representation necessarily has a 
chilling effect on the §202 right of organization and is 
6 / 
inherently destructive of that right.— 
Considering the totality of the evidence, we find that 
the action taken by the Joint Employer was intended to 
effectively annul a key provision of the collective 
bargaining agreement affecting all unit employees other than 
those in the Civil Bureau, to wit. job security. Moreover, 
it was intended to evade the Joint Employer's duty to 
negotiate job security to the extent that such a provision 
might be otherwise applicable to a successor Sheriff. 
6/Thus. in County of Suffolk. 15 PERB 1F3021 (1982). 
we found a violation where the public employer granted a 
benefit to unit employees without negotiating its action 
with the employees' representative. See also Fashion 
Institute of Technology. 5 PERB 1[3018 (1972). rev'd on 
other grounds. Fashion Institute of Technology v. Helsby. 
44 A.D. 2d 550. 7 PERB ir7005 (1st Dep' t 1974). 
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By changing the job description of Deputy Sheriff for 
this purpose, the Joint Employer's action constituted 
improper coercion. Our decision in Board of Education of the 
II . City School District of the City of Mew York.— is a 
relevant precedent. There, we found a violation of 
§209-a.l(a) in that a public employer took steps to 
reclassify the positions of some of its employees in order to 
frustrate their organization, even though there was no 
evidence that the public employer bore any animus towards the 
union that was seeking to organize those employees. We noted 
that the public employer could have undertaken the 
reclassification for bona fide business reasons; however, it 
violated the statute because the record established that it 
would not have undertaken that reclassification but for the 
employees' exercise of rights protected by the Taylor Law. 
The circumstances herein parallel those in the cited 
case. In Board of Education, it was a right of the public 
employer, sanctioned by law, to reclassify its employees for 
bona fide business reasons. Here, it was a right of the 
public employer, sanctioned by contract, to change the 
content of unit positions for bona fide business reasons so 
long as it followed contractually dictated procedures. The 
1/18 PERB 1f3068 (1985). 
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gravamen of the violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law in 
both cases is that the public employer was improperly 
motivated in taking actions that would otherwise be permitted. 
We do not find that the Association consented to the 
Joint Employer's conduct by agreeing to the continuation of 
§2.3.1 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement after 
the arbitrator interpreted it as permitting the Joint 
Employer to change the job content of deputy sheriffs so long 
as it complied with the contractual process. The issue 
before the arbitrator was one of contract interpretation; how 
the Joint Employer could change job content. The Taylor Law 
question — may the Joint Employer change job content for the 
purpose of constricting its duty to negotiate job security — 
was not before the arbitrator. Thus, the Association's 
agreement to continue §2.3.1 of the contract did not 
constitute a waiver of its right to challenge the motivation 
behind the Joint Employer's action. Neither did the 
agreement constitute a waiver of the negotiated job security 
clause.— 
JL/Although the violation of a collective bargaining 
agreement does not. by itself, constitute an improper 
practice. §205.5(d) of the Taylor Law provides that we 
shall "exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of 
such an agreement that would . . . otherwise constitute an 
improper employer or employee organization practice." It 
is therefore appropriate for us to interpret the agreement 
and determine that Local 2964 did not consent to the Joint 
Employer's conduct herein. 
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There is a further parallel between Board of Education 
and the instant case. In both, the affected employee 
interests were potential rather than immediate rights. In 
Board of Education, no employee organization had yet been 
recognized or certified to represent the employees when the 
improper conduct occurred. In the instant case, the Joint 
Employer's change can affect employees only when, at some 
future time, a new Sheriff will take office. As noted in 
Board of Education, however, the potential injury diminishes 
present rights of public employees. 
Having reversed the determination of the ALJ that the 
Joint Employer's conduct herein was consistent with its 
obligations under §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. we must 
consider the Joint Employer's affirmative defense that the 
charge was not timely. The basis of this defense is the 
Joint Employer's contention that the conduct complained about 
in the charge occurred on July 9. 1982, when the Sheriff 
first announced his intention of assigning civil duties to 
police deputies, or. at the latest, during March 1983 when 
the Sheriff actually did so. In either case, this was more 
. . 9/ 
than four months prior to the filing of the charge.— 
We find that the four months during which to file the 
charge began to run in November 1983 when the Sheriff 
9_/Section 204.1(a)(1) of the Rules of this Board 
permits the filing of a charge within four months of the 
conduct complained of. 
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delivered to Local 2964 the amended job description for 
titles not in the Civil Bureau. The announced intention of 
the Sheriff on July 9. 1982 was not the operative event 
constituting the violation. After Local 2964 expressed its 
objection, nothing further was done by the Sheriff for nine 
months. This could well have indicated to Local 2964 that 
the Sheriff was not going ahead with his plan and therefore 
no charge was necessary. The institution of the plan in 
March 1983 was also not the operative event triggering a 
charge. Local 2964 had no actual knowledge of it. Neither 
did the few assignments made give it constructive 
9/ knowledge.— Accordingly, we find the charge timely. 
1
 NOW. THEREFORE, to remedy its violation of §209-a.l(a) 
of the Taylor Law. WE ORDER the Joint Employer to: 
1. cease and desist from assigning civil duties to 
deputy sheriffs who are not in the Civil Bureau 
for the purpose of rendering them subject to 
demotion or dismissal at the discretion of a 
successor Sheriff; 
2. remove the language "performs civil duties as 
required" from the job descriptions of deputy 
sheriffs; 
9/The time to file a charge runs from when charging 
party knew or should have known of the violation. City of 
Yonkers. 7 PERB ir3007 (1974); County of Ulster. 14 PERB 
1F3008 (1981). 
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3. post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used for communicating with deputy 
sheriffs. 
WE FURTHER ORDER that in all other respects the charge 
herein be, and it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: November 25. 19 85 
Albany. New York 
'JLM^—IAAJ^^-—-"' 
Newman, Chairman 
David C. Randies, Member 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
10056 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLICL EMPLQYMENX BELATIOMS_BQABD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the County of Monroe and Monroe County Sheriff, a 
joint employer, represented by the Security and Law Enforcement Employees, 
AFSCME Council 82 and Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs Local 2964 of the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, that 
the Joint Employer: 
1. will not assign civil duties to deputy sheriffs other than those 
in- the Civil Bureau for the purpose of rendering them subject to 
demotion or dismissal at the discretion of a successor Sheriff. 
2. will remove the language "performs civil duties as required" from the 
job descriptions of deputy sheriffs. 
County of Monroe and Monroe County Sheriff 
Dated By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
10057 
#2B-ll/25/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
A PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-8121 
NIAGARA FRONTIER TRANSPORTATION 
AUTHORITY PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
DAVID F. MIX, ESQ.. for Respondent. 
SARGENT & REPKA, P.C. (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT, ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Charging Party. 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was brought by the Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority Public Safety Officers Benevolent 
Association (Association) on behalf of a unit of safety 
officers. It complains that the Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Authority (Authority) unilaterally assigned 
unit work to nonunit employees. The Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) dismissed the charge without a hearing on the 
ground that it failed to allege facts sufficient to 
constitute a violation of the statute.— More 
•I/The ALJ also considered the Association's 
particularization of its charge. 
10058 
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specifically, he determined that the charge is defective 
because it does not allege any material detriment to the 
unit employees. The matter comes to us on the exceptions of 
the Association. 
The Association alleges that unit employees had 
performed various security duties, including crash and fire 
rescue, medical treatment, checkpoint security, as well as 
road patrol security, night security, bomb security and 
hijack security. It further alleges that on May 1. 1985, 
the Authority restricted the unit employees to crash and 
fire rescue, medical treatment and checkpoint security, the 
other police and/or security work being transferred "to the 
Airport Transport Police Agency, who are not represented by 
the Association." 
It did not allege that this transfer of unit work had 
caused any direct, immediate or specifically identifiable 
detriment to the unit employees' terms and conditions of 
employment. According to the ALJ, such an allegation is an 
essential element of a valid charge complaining about the 
transfer of unit work to nonunit employees. 
Apparently there is some ambiguity in our previous 
decisions regarding this point. In Scarsdale PBA, 8 PERB 
1P075. at 3133 (1975), this Board held that "job content of 
current employees is a mandatory subject of negotiations so 
long as the negotiations demand would not narrow the 
inherent nature of the employment involved." There, without 
reaching the question of detriment or benefit to individuals 1005 
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employees, we found a demand that police not be assigned to 
repair police patrol vehicles to be mandatory because such 
repair work was not part of the inherent nature of the work 
of police. The Association argues that it has alleged that 
the security duties which the Authority has removed from the 
unit employees has been part of the inherent nature of the 
work, and that it therefore established a prima facie case 
when it alleged that the Authority narrowed that employment 
unilaterally. 
The ALJ. however, relied upon this Board's three 
"civilianization" decisions for the proposition that 
unilateral action by an employer diminishing the job duties 
of unit employees is not improper, absent a detriment to the 
unit employees' terms and conditions of employment. In 
those cases this Board dismissed complaints that public 
employers improperly assigned some duties of police officers 
to civilian employees. 
The first of the civilianization decisions is County of 
Suffolk. 12 PERB 1F3123 (1979). In that case we found that 
the employer's action related primarily to the 
qualifications of the employees "assigned to certain record 
maintenance, teletype and training tasks." We ruled that a 
public employer might determine that the qualifications 
applicable to police officers were not necessary for the 
performance of those duties. However, we proceeded to 
indicate that the mere reassignment of duties previously 
10060 
\, 
Board - U-8121 
-4 
performed by police officers to employees who do not meet 
the qualifications of police officers would not ordinarily 
mean that the jobs cease to be unit work. Rather, we 
indicated that the question whether the jobs continue to be 
unit work could not be decided by the employer 
unilaterally.- Thus, in Avoca CSD. 15 PERB 1f3128 (1982), 
we found that a public employer violated the Taylor Law by 
abolishing a nurse/teacher's position and replacing it with 
the position of school nurse because it treated the new 
position as being outside the unit. Noting that the 
qualifications were different but the job duties were the 
same, we said, at p.3200: 
When an employer simply alters the 
qualifications for a unit position without 
substantially altering the position itself 
through a significant change in duties, it 
may not, in conjunction therewith, treat 
the position as lying outside the unit and 
unilaterally change the terms and 
conditions of employment of the position's 
incumbent. To allow such unilateral action 
would be to allow an employer to circumvent 
and undermine an employee organization's 
representative status. 
The sole discussion in County of Suffolk regarding 
civilianization as a possible detriment to unit employees 
was in a footnote in which we noted that there was no such 
2/There, the parties had defined the unit not in 
terms of tasks, but in terms of the qualifications of the 
employees who performed them. The implication of this was 
that the parties agreed that if the tasks were not 
performed by police officers, it would not be unit work. 
100 
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3/ . . . . . 
detriment.— The other two civilianization decisions. 
City of Albany. 13 PERB V3011 (1980). and City of New 
Rochelle, 13 PERB V3045 (1980). are based upon Suffolk 
County, but in deciding them, we gave further emphasis to 
the absence of detriment to individual unit employees by-
noting that this absence was a "significant" factor. 
In two other decisions this Board permitted a public 
employer to reassign unit work to nonunit employees under 
circumstances when the public employer had changed the 
qualifications of those assigned. In West Hempstead UFSD. 
14 PERB ir3096 (1981). we did so notwithstanding a 
significant impact upon the unit employees' terms and 
conditions of employment, while in Town of Brookhaven. 17 
PERB 1F3087 (1984). there was no such impact because the 
employer had offered the unit employees alternative 
assignments which carried with them the same terms and 
conditions of employment. The basis of our decision in 
these two cases was a balancing test which indicated that 
management interests related to its mission predominated 
over the employee interests in their terms and conditions 
of employment. 
^There was a significant impact upon the terms and 
conditions of the nurse/teacher in Avoca CSD. and this was 
emphasized in our decision. 
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In reviewing our past decisions, we wish to eliminate 
any possible ambiguity suggesting that the Taylor Law permits 
a public employer to transfer unit work to nonunit employees 
unilaterally so long as its action does not impose a 
detriment upon the terms and conditions of employment of 
individual unit employees. Even if no individual employees 
suffer a direct, immediate and specifically identifiable 
detriment to their terms and conditions of employment, their 
rights of organization and representation may be diminished 
if the scope of the negotiating unit is reduced. There may 
be a qualitative difference between individual detriments 
that are direct and immediate, and group benefits. The 
former may be more consequential, but the Taylor Law is 
4/ 
clearly concerned with the latter as well.- Thus, if a 
balancing test is required, the nature of the detriment would 
be taken into consideration. 
With respect to the unilateral transfer of unit work, the 
initial essential questions are whether the work had been 
performed by unit employees exclusively—' and whether the 
reassigned tasks are substantially similar to those previously 
performed by unit employees. If both these questions are 
answered in the affirmative, there has been a violation of 
4/see §§202 and 203 of the Taylor Law. 
S/See Guilderland CSD. 16 PERB 1f3038 (1983) 
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§209-a.l(d), unless the qualifications for the job have 
been changed significantly. Absent such a change, the loss 
of unit work to the group is sufficient detriment for the 
finding of a violation. If. however, there has been a 
significant change in the job qualifications, then a 
balancing test is invoked; the interests of the public 
employer and the unit employees, both individually and 
collectively, are weighed against each other. 
Finding that the charge, as particularized, alleges 
facts that may constitute an improper practice. 
WE REVERSE the decision of the ALJ 
dismissing the charge for failure to 
establish a cause of action, and 
WE REMAND the matter for further 
proceedings consistent herewith. 
DATED: November 25. 1985 
Albany, New York 
-^Q^JLSZ P>, /fa< 9-tu j 
Harold-, R. Newman. Chai rman l l d n  
David C. R a n d i e s . Jfember 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g . Memhfer 
#2C-11/25/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF ROCKVILLE 
CENTRE. 
Respondent. 
-and- CASE NO. U-8008 
ROCKVILLE CENTRE VILLAGE EMPLOYEES 
CIVIL SERVICE ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
SEWARD & SEWARD, ESQS. (JAMES J. SEWARD. ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
SCHLACHTER AND MAURO. ESQS.. for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre (Village) to the 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) holding that it 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by unilaterally 
changing a term and condition of employment of some of its 
employees in a negotiating unit represented by the Rockville 
Centre Village Employees Civil Service Association 
(Association). The alleged unilateral change is that during 
January 1985. it restricted unit employees who worked at the 
Village Hall to taking their coffee breaks at the Village 
Hall whereas they had previously been permitted to leave the 
premises of the Village Hall during their coffee breaks. 
10Q65 
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All the record evidence is contained in a stipulation 
prepared by the ALJ and consented to by the parties.— It 
provides: 
1. Unit members employed at the Village Hall 
have been allowed to take coffee breaks away 
from the Village Hall since 
2. By memo dated January 11. 1985 (attached to 
the charge). William Cook. Village 
Administrator, announced that henceforth 
Village Hall employees must take their coffee 
breaks in the employee lounge in the Village 
Hall. 
3. Other than this memo, the only notice of the 
Village's intent to impose the rule occurred 
on January 9. 1985 at which time Cook called 
a general staff meeting of Village Hall 
employees to discuss the Village's rationale 
for implementing the rule. No objections or 
questions were raised by the Village Hall 
employees in attendance. 
4. While many Village Hall employees are 
Association members, the Association 
president was neither a Village Hall employee 
nor called by Cook to attend the meeting. 
5. No negotiations were held prior to the 
Village's imposition of the rule and the 
Association has demanded none since its 
imposition or since the meeting of January 9. 
1985. 
6. Until the imposition of the rule, only 
Village Hall unit members and employees who 
work out doors were not required to take 
their coffee breaks in designated areas. 
i/The Village explicitly stated in its brief to the 
ALJ that this stipulation had set forth the undisputed. 
facts. It nevertheless referred to other alleged facts 
both in that brief and in its brief to us in support of its 
exceptions. We are foreclosed from.relying upon those 
alleged facts for decision. 
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7. Since 1976, the Village Hall has had an 
employee lounge containing a sink, stove, 
refrigerator, table and chairs. While it was 
relocated in 1982. the lounge contained these 
facilities until late 1983 or early 1984 at 
which time the Village installed instant hot 
water and a microwave oven. 
8. The Village's rationale for imposing the rule 
is that, in its opinion. "Xo allow emproyees 
out of the Village Hall during coffee breaks 
subjects the Village to an increased and 
unwarranted risk of injury and adversely 
affects the operations of the Village Hall". 
The ALJ found that until mid-January 1985. unit 
employees assigned to the Village Hall had been free to 
leave the premises during their coffee breaks, and that 
during that month, the Village unilaterally denied them that 
freedom. He proceeded to determine that the right of an 
employee to leave the work site during a coffee break is 
comparable to other forms of paid time off and is a term and 
condition of employment which is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. He further determined that a public employer 
may not lawfully alter such a term or condition of 
employment unilaterally. 
The Village makes four arguments in support of its 
exceptions. 
1. The ALJ erred in finding "that the leaving of the 
Village Hall during coffee breaks constituted a past 
practice . . . . " 
With reference to this argument, the stipulation 
provides: "Unit members employed at the Village Hall have 
been allowed to take coffee breaks away from the Village 
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. at least. 1978". but that the Village terminated 
ice on January 11. 1985. It also shows that the 
11 had an employee lounge since 1976 and that the 
upgraded by the addition of instant hot water 
and a microwave oven in late 1983 or early 1984. 
Finally, it shows that except for employees assigned to 
Village Hall and those who work out doors, all unit members 
have been required to take their coffee breaks in designated 
areas. 
The Village argues that the past practice was that unit 
employees assigned to indoor locations had been required to 
take coffee breaks on the premises except where there were 
no adequate facilities on the premises. Thus, according to 
the Village, a temporary exception had been made for Village 
Hall employees because there had not been adequate 
facilities for them at Village Hall. There is no record 
2/ 
support for this argument.— 
2/ln making this argument the Village's brief cites 
evidence, not in the record, that the Village Hall had been 
renovated, and argues that this was the reason for the temporary 
exception. Even the extra-record evidence relied upon by the 
Village does not support its position. Its own brief indicates 
that the renovations were completed in 1978. Thus, the Village's 
extra-record evidence shows that the past practice continued for 
six years after the alleged renovations of the Village Hall were 
completed. 
Citing record evidence, the ALJ noted that the past practice 
continued for one year after the lounge facilities had been 
upgraded to their present level. 
Hall since 
this pract 
Village Ha 
lounge was 
facilities 
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2. The ALJ erred in finding "that the right of an 
employee to leave his work site during a coffee break was a 
term and condition of employment . . . ." 
The Village appears to be applying a balancing test in 
support of this proposition. It would have us find that the 
impact of its new work rule upon unit employees was slight 
because there are lounge facilities at Village Hall. 
Against this allegedly slight impact, it argues that it 
would suffer more severe harm in that it would be subjected 
j 
to public criticism by reason of employees being seen on the 
streets during working hours, be inconvenienced in the event 
that the employees were needed to deal with an emergency, 
and be exposed to greater risk of injury to its employees. 
Coffee break time, as noted by the ALJ. is nonworking 
time, and the freedom of employees to go where they please 
during nonworking time is of sufficient importance to them 
to be deemed a mandatory subject of negotiation unless there 
3/ is a very serious management interest at stake.- There 
is no such management interest here. 
I/See State of New York. 18 PERB 1F3064 (1985). in 
which we found that the need to reduce pilferage is a 
management interest of sufficient magnitude to render the 
institution of a parcel inspection program a nonmandatory 
subject of negotiation even though it involved a 
significant employee interest. 
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3. The ALJ erred in finding "that the right of an 
employee to leave the work site during a coffee break [is] 
equated to other forms of paid time off . . . ." 
The Village argues: "There is a significant difference 
in that the coffee break is during the regular work day and 
was conceived as a short break, rest period or the like 
during which an employee could stretch their legs, get a 
refreshment, etc." 
This description of a coffee break does not support the 
Village's proposition. Furthermore, the nature of a coffee 
break, as described by the Village, is itself subject to 
negotiation. 
4. The ALJ erred in finding "that the failure of the 
Association to demand negotiations did not constitute a 
waiver." 
The Village gives a very narrow reading of 
§209-a.l(d). It says that unilateral action cannot 
constitute a violation; a violation, if any. occurs only if 
a union seeks to negotiate with respect to a unilateral 
change and the employer refuses. 
As noted by the ALJ, this is not the Board's 
interpretation of §209-a.l(d). On the contrary, the duty to 
negotiate in good faith means that a public employer may not 
unilaterally change terms and conditions of employment with 
4/ 
respect to which it is required to negotiate.— 
i/County of Cattaraugus, 8 PERB 1f3062 (1975); County 
of Schenectady and Sheriff. 18 PERB 1f3038 (1985). 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER the Incorporated Village of 
Rockville Centre to: 
1. rescind the memo issued by its Village 
Administrator on January 11. 1985. to the 
extent it involves unit members; 
2. restore its practice of allowing unit members 
employed at the Village Hall to take their 
coffee breaks at locations other than the 
building in which they work; 
3. cease and desist from refusing to negotiate in 
good faith with the Association concerning 
terms and conditions of employment; and 
4. sign and post the attached notice at all 
locations customarily used to post 
communications to unit members. 
DATED: November 25. 19 85 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
{Q^v^^' 
Walter L. Eisehberg 
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' PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
---,-:— --—: -ar>cJ In-or-dw-te-»ff*clu8-!-t the poHctee of the — — 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we b»r»by ratify employees of the Incorporated Village of Rockville 
Centre (Village) within the unit represented by the Rockville 
Centre Village Employees Civil Service Association (Association) 
that the Village 
1. will rescind the memorandum issued by its Village 
Administrator dated January 11, 1985, to the extent 
it involves unit members; and 
2. will restore its practice of allowing unit members 
employed at the Village Hall to take their coffee 
breaks at locations other than the building in 
which they work; and 
3. will negotiate in good faith with the Association 
concerning terms and conditions of employment. 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF ROCKVILLE 
CENTRE 
Dsie-d. By (Rfrpra-t-»nt«ttv») (TttW) 
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This Notice must remain posted for 3D consecutive days Irom the date of posting, and must not be altera 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#3A-11/25/85 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF OLEAN HOUSING AUTHORITY. 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-29II 
OLEAN HOUSING AUTHORITY EMPLOYEE 
ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Olean Housing Authority 
Employee Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named employer, in the 
unit described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Projects Coordinator, Maintenance 
Supervisor. Maintenance Mechanic. 
Tenant Selection Clerk, and Assistant 
Maintenance Mechanic. 
Excluded: Executive Director. 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Olean Housing Authority 
Employee Association and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees in the unit found appropriate, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of, and administration of, grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: November 25. 1985 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF ALFRED, 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-2980 
CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS. WAREHOUSEMEN & 
HELPERS LOCAL UNION. NO. 65. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Chauffeurs. Teamsters. Ware-
housemen & Helpers Local Union, No. 65 has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All employees of the Town Highway 
Department. 
Excluded: Highway superintendent, guards, clerical 
and supervisory personnel and all other 
employees. 
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Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Ware-
housemen & Heplers Local Union. No. 65 and enter into a written 
agreement with such employee organization with regard to terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees in the above unit, and 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of. and administration of. grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: November 25. 1985 
Albany, New York 
Xkvtietg # A/L 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LAKE SHORE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-2881 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264. I.B.T. 
Petitioner. 
-and-
LAKE SHORE CENTRAL UNIT. CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations. Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 264. I.B.T. 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named employer, in the unit described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All nonteaching staff employed by the 
District. Job classifications of. 
bargaining unit employees include: 
registered professional nurses, teacher 
aides, attendance officer, monitors, 
maintenance, custodians, laborers, 
groundsmen, senior custodians, watchmen, 
mechanics, cleaners/laborer, driver 
trainer, bus drivers,busattendants, 
garage foreman/head mechanic, clerk 
typist, senior clerk typist, senior 
account clerk, senior clerk stenog-
rapher, account clerk/mini computer 
operator, switchboard, senior library 
clerk, senior account clerk typist, clerk 
stenographer, and principal stenographer, 
and audio visual technician. 
Excluded: Nonteaching staff in other bargaining 
units and substitutes. 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 264. I.B.T. 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the unit found appropriate, and shall negotiate 
collectively with such employee organization in the determination 
of, and administration of. grievances of such employees. 
DATED: November 25. 198 5 
Albany, New York 
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d£<cs.?—*c 
-R. Newman, Chairman 
U A! 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
DUANESBURG CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
-and- --_ CASE -NO^  C-2978 
DUANESBURG TEACHERS ASSOCIATION. 
NYSUT, AFT. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
1
 above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Duanesburg Teachers 
Association. NYSUT, AFT. AFL-CIO has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named employer, in 
the unit described below, as their exclusive representative for 
) • 
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the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All hbninstructional""personnel,"' ihcTud-
ing the following positions: aide, bus. 
driver, cook, food service helper, 
cleaner, account/clerk typist, laborer, 
typist, clerk, auto mechanic helper, 
cleaner, auto mechanic, custodian, 
senior account/clerk typist, nurse. 
Excluded: Superintendent, business administrator, 
building principals, supervisor of 
buildings and grounds, an auto 
mechanic (Bruce Schaeffer). trans-
portation supervisor, a cook (Kathryn 
Hillman), an account/clerk typist 
(Betty Hawkes). a typist (Theresa 
Luksa). typist/secretary to the 
superintendent, school nurse teacher, 
a clerk (Vick Merbler). 
Further. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Duanesburg Teachers 
Association. NYSUT. AFT. AFL-CIO and enter into a written 
agreement with such employee organization with regard to terms 
and conditions of employment of the employees in the unit found 
appropriate, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of. and administration of, 
grievances of such employees. 
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DATED: November 25, 1985 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman,Chairman 
David C. Randlesx Membe, 
2f. 
Walter L. E i s e n b e r g , Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MAMARONECK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer. 
-and- CASE NO. C-2963 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. LOCAL 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named employer, in the unit described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All school aides. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
) 
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Further. IT IS. ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. Local 1000. AFSCME. AFL-CIO, and enter into a 
written agreement with such employee organization with regard to 
terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the unit 
found appropriate, and shall negotiate collectively with such 
employee organization in the determination of, and administration 
of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: November 25. 19 8 5 
Albany. New York 
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